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The State charged Appellant Patrick Galindo with attempted murder and 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person. Before trial, his counsel raised the 
question of his competency. The Utah Code provides that a person is incompetent 
to stand trial if he “is suffering from . . . mental retardation resulting . . . in . . . his 
inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against 
him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-
15-1, 77-15-2 (West).1 The trial court ordered two psychological evaluations of Mr. 
Galindo to assess his competency.  
One of the psychological evaluations listed Mr. Galindo’s IQ at 54, plus or 
minus 5—well below the mental retardation threshold score of 70. R.56, 60. This 
psychologist also explained that trial counsel for Mr. Galindo was unavailable to 
discuss Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him and to rationally participate in 
the proceedings before the evaluation was filed. R.65. 
                                            
1 Mr. Galindo was charged July, 6 2016. The language of Utah Code Ann. section 
77-15-2 changed in relevant part in May, 2018, to provide that a person is 
competent to stand trial if he has 
(a) a rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings 
against the defendant and of the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; and 
(b) the ability to consult with the defendant’s legal counsel with a 




The other psychologist used another test, the WASI test, to assess Mr. 
Galindo’s mental capacity. R.45. He reported that Mr. Galindo’s score of T=33 
placed him in the fifth percentile. R.45. This psychologist also admitted that Mr. 
Galindo’s intellectual disability impacted his ability to understand what was 
going on in court. R.48.  
Both psychologists deemed Mr. Galindo competent to stand trial, even 
though they left the final determination of his competency up to the court. At the 
competency hearing, trial counsel for Mr. Galindo stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s 
competency rather than raising and bringing to the court’s attention the many 
issues the reports presented. The trial court relied on trial counsel’s stipulation 
when it found Mr. Galindo competent to stand trial.  
A jury later found Mr. Galindo guilty of attempted murder. Mr. Galindo 
then pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a restricted person for handling the 
gun the night of the shooting. 
Issues Presented 
Issue 1: Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance when he stipulated 
to Mr. Galindo’s competency? 
Standard of Review: “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 
6, 89 P.3d 162.  
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Preservation: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an “exception to 
the preservation requirement.” State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ¶ 35, 276 P.3d 
1207.  
Issue 2: Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance when he failed to 
talk with the court-appointed psychologists to discuss Mr. Galindo’s ability to 
counsel with him and to participate at trial? 
Standard of Review: “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6. 
Preservation: Ineffective assistance of counsel is an “exception to the 
preservation requirement.” Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ¶ 35. Because this claim 
relies on facts outside of the record, Mr. Galindo has filed a Rule 23B motion 
concurrently with this brief. 
Issue 3: Do the above errors cumulate to warrant reversal on appeal 
because together they raise sufficient doubt as to whether Mr. Galindo should 
have been found competent to stand trial? 
Standard of Review: “When reviewing a claim of cumulative error, 
[appellate courts] apply the standard of review applicable to each underlying 
claim of error.” State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶ 53, 397 P.3d 626 (quotation 
omitted). “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on 
appeal presents a question of law.” Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6. 
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Preservation: Cumulative error based on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel circumvents this court’s preservation requirement. State v. Low, 2008 
UT 58, ¶ 19, 192 P.3d 867. 
Statement of the Case 
1. Somebody shot Ramon Guzman 
Late one night, two men were walking down a street in downtown Ogden 
when they “seen two people hanging out of the window” from an apartment 
above them. R.929. The two groups yelled fighting words at each other, and 
Ramon Guzman told the men in the apartment to “bring it over here mother 
f*cker.” R.418; R.841; R.929. Three men exited the apartment, crossed the street, 
and confronted the two men—who at that point were brandishing knives. R.932; 
R.853. The two groups did not know each other. Mr. Guzman thought they were 
going to fight, but almost immediately, the middle of the three assailants shot 
him four times and turned and fled. R843. The gun was later found in the bushes 
near the apartment building. R.716. 
Mr. Guzman—who survived the shooting—said he got a good look at his 
shooter. R.845. He later identified Mr. Galindo as the shooter in a photo line-up. 
R.880–81. Mr. Galindo’s fingerprints were also found on the gun’s magazine. 
R.504–05. 
The police charged Mr. Galindo with attempted murder, felony discharge 
of a firearm, and possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person. R.1. The 
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State dropped the charge of felony discharge of a firearm and the trial court held 
a bifurcated trial, trying only the issue of whether it was Mr. Galindo or someone 
else who shot Mr. Guzman on the street. R.148; R.1260. 
2. The competency determination  
Before trial, trial counsel asked the court to evaluate Mr. Galindo’s 
competency. R.34. As the basis for the competency evaluation, trial counsel 
stated, “In conversing with Mr. Galindo, in the past several court hearings, Mr. 
Galindo does not appear to be able to comprehend what is going on. Or make 
rational decisions regarding this case.” R.37. The court ordered two psychologists 
to examine Mr. Galindo. R.38. 
One of the psychologists who examined Mr. Galindo was Dr. Rick Hawks. 
The Hawks Report placed Mr. Galindo on the schizophrenia spectrum due to the 
voices that Mr. Galindo reported hearing. R.56. It listed his depression and 
anxiety, as well as borderline and antisocial personality disorders. R.56. It 
detailed Mr. Galindo’s suicidal ideations and his past attempt at suicide and self-
mutilation. R.60.  
The Hawks Report reported that Mr. Galindo’s IQ “fell within the mental 
retardation/intellectual impairment range of intellectual functioning”—it 
reported his IQ as 54, plus or minus 5. R.56; R.60. Mental retardation “is clearly 
defined by the American Psychiatric Association” as having a measured IQ of 70 
and below. R.60. The Hawks Report also stated that Dr. Hawks had not been able 
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to speak with Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel before making his ultimate conclusion 
regarding Mr. Galindo’s competence, despite an attempt to contact him during 
the course of the evaluation. R.65. 
The other psychologist who examined Mr. Galindo was Dr. Renée 
Wilkinson. Like the Hawks Report, the Wilkinson Report weighed in on Mr. 
Galindo’s intelligence. Using the WASI test (Weschler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence), the Wilkinson Report placed Mr. Galindo at an IQ score of T=33, 
placing him in the fifth percentile. R.45. The Wilkinson Report initially stated 
that Mr. Galindo “is not able to consult with his attorney and participate in the 
proceeding against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,” but 
concluded that Mr. Galindo was competent to proceed to trial anyway. R.41. The 
Wilkinson Report also acknowledged that Mr. Galindo was “confused by what is 
being discussed in court,” but stated that if he was confused he could “ask his 
attorney to explain matters to him.” R.48. 
At the hearing to determine Mr. Galindo’s competency, trial counsel 
stipulated that Mr. Galindo was competent to stand trial. R.378. The trial court 
relied on trial counsel’s stipulation, stating, “Based on the two reports and 
stipulation of counsel the Court will enter a finding then that Mr. Galindo is 
competent to proceed.” R.379.  
At trial, the State admitted evidence that the victim identified Mr. Galindo 
as his shooter from a photo lineup. R.880. A police officer testified that in 
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another photo lineup, the victim’s friend—the only other eyewitness close enough 
to identify the shooter—picked out one of Mr. Galindo’s friends as the shooter 
with 100% certainty. R.1000–05.  
A gun found near the crime scene was also admitted into evidence. R.437, 
757. No fingerprints were recovered from the gun, R.1047, but Mr. Galindo’s 
fingerprints were found on the magazine, R.1034–45. The gun’s DNA testing was 
inconclusive because there were too many DNA samples to narrow down the 
result. R.823–26. 
After the State rested, the defense admitted evidence that Mr. Galindo was 
in the bathroom with his on-again off-again girlfriend “messing around” at the 
moment of the shooting. R.1093–95. Girlfriend also explained that a gun was 
present at the party that night and that the guys looked at it and handled it—
including Mr. Galindo. R.1091. She testified that she and Mr. Galindo left the 
bathroom after they heard shouting, and that they ran outside but that she never 
lost sight of Mr. Galindo. R.1095–1103. During examination of a police witness, 
defense counsel admitted evidence that the police refused to interview Girlfriend 
when she contacted them about the case. R.915.  
The defense also admitted evidence that there was another prime suspect 
who was never actually investigated—the tenant of the apartment where Mr. 
Galindo had spent the evening. R.1008. Defense counsel discovered that the 
police never showed a photo of the tenant in a photo lineup to any of the 
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witnesses—including the victim and his friend—who were asked to identify the 
shooter. R.902, 1008–09. 
A jury found Mr. Galindo guilty of attempted murder. R.1248. 
3. 23B Evidence 
Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel has submitted an affidavit detailing what he 
would have told Dr. Hawks had he communicated with Dr. Hawks while Dr. 
Hawks was writing his report. (See Randy Richards Aff. Add D.) Trial counsel’s 
affidavit explained: 
• It was abundantly clear that Mr. Galindo was intellectually disabled; 
• Mr. Galindo was unable to assist with preparation for trial; 
• Mr. Galindo could not give his trial counsel information about the 
incident, making it impossible to get adequate witnesses for the 
defense; 
• Mr. Galindo did not appear to be able to understand the 
proceedings; 
• Mr. Galindo would agree with anything trial counsel suggested; 
• Trial counsel tested Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him at trial 
by asking him two questions in a row, both suggesting totally 
opposite answers; 
• Mr. Galindo would respond in the affirmative to two totally opposing 
questions in a row; 
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• Mr. Galindo was conversant and happy and did not understand the 
gravity of the offenses and did not understand there was a possibility 
he could lose at trial; 
• Had counsel connected with Dr. Hawks, counsel would have been 
able to give him information as to his frustrations trying to prepare a 
defense for Mr. Galindo due to his inability to understand the gravity 
of the charges; 
• Mr. Galindo could not adequately testify at trial; 
• Under normal circumstances, trial counsel would have put Mr. 
Galindo on the stand to explain where he was at the time of the 
shooting, but it was impossible due to Mr. Galindo’s intellectual 
disability, his inability to understand complex questions, and his 
total inability to be able to withstand any kind of cross examination. 
 (Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.). 
Summary of the Argument 
Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he stipulated 
to Mr. Galindo’s competency to withstand trial in light of the findings in the 
psychologists’ reports. The psychologists’ reports indicated that Mr. Galindo’s IQ 
placed him far below the mental retardation range, that he was struggling to 
understand the proceedings, and that he was unable to participate or counsel 
with his attorney in a rational way. But counsel stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s 
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competence anyway. Because the trial court relied on counsel’s stipulation, this 
error harmed Mr. Galindo. 
Trial counsel likewise provided ineffective assistance when he failed to 
discuss with one psychologist Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him at trial or 
to participate in the proceedings against him. In a rule 23B affidavit, trial counsel 
admits that had he spoken with the psychologist while the psychologist was 
preparing his report, he would have provided details supporting a finding of 
incompetence. There is no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel’s decision 
not to discuss Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him and participate in the 
proceedings when trial counsel himself requested a psychological evaluation and 
competency hearing. 
In light of the above, cumulative error demands reversal. Had Mr. Galindo 
gotten a hearing where the psychologists and trial court considered the evidence 
included in trial counsel’s affidavit coupled with a vigorous—or even competent—
argument from trial counsel that Mr. Galindo could not participate in his own 
defense, the outcome of the competency hearing would have been quite different. 
Trial counsel’s double-whammy of (1) stipulating to competency and (2) utterly 
failing to talk to Dr. Hawks left Mr. Galindo—for all intents and purposes—
without an advocate. These two issues should cumulate to obliterate this court’s 




1. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he stipulated 
to Mr. Galindo’s competency 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have Assistance 
of counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. That right is now recognized 
as the right to “effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 771 fn. 14 (1970) (emphasis added) (“It has long been recognized that the 
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”). 
To show constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Galindo 
must show (1) error, i.e. “that [his] counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) 
“that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
1.1 It was error for trial counsel to stipulate to competency 
under the circumstances 
Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel erred when he stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s 
competency in light of the findings in the psychologists’ reports.  
To show attorney error, Mr. Galindo must show “that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering all 
the circumstances.” State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 23, 309 P.3d 1160. 
Furthermore, “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” 
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Id. In other words, he must show “that there was no conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel’s actions.” State v. Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶ 32, 414 P.3d 559. 
The Utah Code provides that “no person who is incompetent shall be tried 
for a public offense.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 (West). For purposes of trial  
 
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from 
a mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either 
in: 
 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him or of the 
punishment specified for the offense charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to 
participate in the proceedings against him with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding 
Id. § 77-15-2. Thus, in statutory shorthand, Mr. Galindo could be incompetent to 
stand trial if he was “suffering from . . . mental retardation resulting . . . in . . . his 
ability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against 
him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Id. 
Trial counsel asked for a review of Mr. Galindo’s competency because, he 
stated, “In conversing with Mr. Galindo, in the past several court hearings, Mr. 
Galindo does not appear to be able to comprehend what is going on. Or make 
rational decisions regarding this case.” R.37.  
The subsequent psychologists’ reports confirmed trial counsel’s 
observations. The Hawks Report concluded that Mr. Galindo’s IQ was 54, plus or 
minus 5—falling “within the mental retardation/intellectual impairment range of 
intellectual functioning.” R.56; R.60. The Wilkinson Report used the WASI test, 
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which placed Mr. Galindo’s IQ at 33—landing him in the bottom fifth percentile. 
R.45. The Wilkinson Report also stated that Mr. Galindo “is not able to consult 
with his attorney and participate in the proceeding against him with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding.” R.41. That report also acknowledged Mr. 
Galindo’s confusion in court. R.48. 
All of this comes together to paint a very clear picture of a person who “is 
incompetent to proceed” because “he is suffering from . . . mental retardation 
resulting . . . in his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2.  
Trial counsel is not faulted with erring if, under an objective standard of 
reasonableness, there is any tactical basis for his actions. Campos, 2013 UT App 
213, ¶ 23; Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶ 32. Trial counsel is also granted the 
head-start of receiving the presumption that “the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy.” Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 23. 
There can be no sound trial strategy that includes sending a cognitively 
impaired client to stand trial for a crime he maintains he never committed. That 
is not tactical or objectively reasonable. Trial counsel believed Mr. Galindo was 
impaired enough to ask the court to examine his competency because “in the past 
several court hearings, Mr. Galindo does not appear to be able to comprehend 
what is going on. Or make rational decisions regarding this case.” R.37.  
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After receiving reports stating that medical professionals had determined 
that Mr. Galindo’s low IQ did indeed place him well within the mental 
retardation range, that Mr. Galindo was struggling to understand the 
proceedings, and that he was “not able to consult with his attorney and 
participate in the proceeding against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding,” R.41; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2, there is no conceivable tactical 
basis for trial counsel’s stipulation to competency. 
1.2 Trial counsel’s stipulation to competency harmed Mr. 
Galindo, because the trial court relied on it instead of 
conducting its own review of the issue 
In addition to showing error, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Id.  
A person may meet the statutory incompetency test in many ways. One way 
is to show  
(1) that you are “suffering from . . . mental retardation 
resulting . . . in”  
(2) “[your] inability to consult with [] counsel and to 
participate in the proceedings against [you] with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (West) (emphases added).  
The mental retardation aspect of the test is clearly met in Mr. Galindo: 
mental retardation “is clearly defined by the American Psychiatric Association” as 
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having a measured IQ of 70 and below. R.60. Mr. Galindo’s IQ is reportedly 
about 54, plus or minus 5, which is on his best day somewhere closer to 59—still 
11 points shy of 70. And one report stated he was in the bottom fifth percentile. 
R.45. 
What’s more, one report in no uncertain terms stated that he was “not able 
to consult with his attorney and participate in the proceeding against him with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding.” R.41; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2. 
But at the competency hearing, trial counsel failed to argue on Mr. 
Galindo’s behalf that Mr. Galindo was incompetent even though, as the 
psychologists’ reports indicated, his IQ placed him far below the mental 
retardation range, he was struggling to understand the proceedings, and he was 
unable to participate or counsel with his attorney in a rational way. R.41. 
Instead, at the competency hearing, trial counsel stipulated that Mr. 
Galindo was competent to stand trial. R.378. And the trial court relied on trial 
counsel’s stipulation, giving as one of its reasons for entering a finding of 
“competent to proceed” the “stipulation of counsel.” R.379.  
Had trial counsel argued the above to the court and provided the court with 
personal accounts of dealings with Mr. Galindo, the court would have at least had 
an opportunity to assess Mr. Galindo’s competency instead of relying on the 
stipulation. Surely had counsel not stipulated to competency, the court would 
have seen that Mr. Galindo’s incompetency precluded him from standing trial. At 
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the very least, this court’s confidence in the outcome of the competency 
proceeding should be seriously undermined. 
 
2. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to 
talk with Mr. Galindo’s psychologist to discuss Mr. Galindo’s 
ability to counsel with him at trial or to participate in the 
proceedings 
Trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed 
to discuss with one psychologist Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him at trial 
or to participate in the proceedings against him. 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Galindo must show (1) error, 
i.e. “that [his] counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
2.1 Trial counsel erred when he failed to discuss his 
observations with Dr. Hawks, who was assessing his 
client’s competency at his own request 
To show attorney error, Mr. Galindo must show “that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering all 
the circumstances,” “overcom[ing] the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” 
Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 23. 
Before trial was scheduled, trial counsel requested that the court evaluate 
Mr. Galindo’s competency. R.34. As the basis for the competency evaluation, trial 
counsel stated, “In conversing with Mr. Galindo, in the past several court 
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hearings, Mr. Galindo does not appear to be able to comprehend what is going 
on. Or make rational decisions regarding this case.” R.37. The court ordered two 
psychologists to examine Mr. Galindo. R.38. The Hawks Report explained that 
Dr. Hawks had not been able to speak with Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel before 
making his ultimate conclusion regarding Mr. Galindo’s competence, despite an 
attempt to contact him during the course of the evaluation. R.65.  
Trial counsel called for the evaluation himself based upon his belief that his 
client was incompetent to stand trial. Trial counsel has submitted an affidavit 
explaining why he believed—and still believes—his client was incompetent to 
stand trial. (Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.); see infra § 2.2 (including the 
substance of the affidavit in arguing prejudice). That affidavit supports a finding 
a finding that Mr. Galindo could not participate in the trial or counsel with his 
trial counsel meaningfully. Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2. 
In light of trial counsel’s belief that his client was incompetent to stand 
trial, there is no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel’s decision not to 
discuss Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him and participate in the 
proceedings when trial counsel requested a psychological evaluation and 
competency hearing himself. See Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶ 32. 
 
2.2 Trial counsel’s failure to talk to Dr. Hawks harmed Mr. 
Galindo, as Dr. Hawks could not consider trial counsel’s 




A “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Id. 
Mr. Galindo has filed a rule 23B motion concurrently with this brief. Rule 
23B motions are used to “supplement the record with known facts needed for an 
appellant to assert an ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal.” State v. 
Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, ¶ 15, 317 P.3d 968 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
These motions must  
(1) contain a nonspeculative allegation of facts that  
(2) do not fully appear in the record, which, if true,  
(3) could support a determination that counsel’s performance was              
deficient, and  
(4) demonstrate that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result. 
 
Id. Additionally, rule 23B motions must “be accompanied by affidavits . . . that 
show the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed 
deficient performance.” Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). 
In an affidavit to this court supporting a 23B motion for remand, trial 
counsel tells this court what he would have told Dr. Hawks: 
 
• It was abundantly clear that Mr. Galindo was intellectually disabled; 
• Mr. Galindo was unable to assist with preparation for trial; 
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• Mr. Galindo could not give trial counsel information about the 
incident, making it impossible to get adequate witnesses for the 
defense; 
• Mr. Galindo did not appear to be able to understand the 
proceedings; 
• Mr. Galindo would agree with anything trial counsel suggested; 
• Trial counsel tested Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him at trial 
by asking him two questions in a row, both suggesting totally 
opposite answers; 
• Mr. Galindo would respond in the affirmative to two totally opposing 
questions in a row; 
• Mr. Galindo was conversant and happy and did not understand the 
gravity of the offenses and did not understand there was a possibility 
he could lose at trial; 
• Had he connected with Dr. Hawks, trial counsel would have been 
able to give him information as to his frustrations trying to prepare a 
defense for Mr. Galindo due to his inability to understand the gravity 
of the charges; 
• Mr. Galindo could not adequately testify at trial; 
• Under normal circumstances, trial counsel would have put Mr. 
Galindo on the stand to explain where he was at the time of the 
attempted murder, but it was impossible due to Mr. Galindo’s 
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intellectual disability, his inability to understand complex questions, 
and his total inability to be able to withstand any kind of cross 
examination; 
 (Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.). 
 Together, the evidence of trial counsel’s interactions with Mr. Galindo and 
the undisputed conclusions in the psychologists’ reports that Mr. Galindo was 
suffering from mental retardation would have led the court to conclude that Mr. 
Galindo was incompetent.  
 A person is incompetent if he is (1) suffering from mental retardation that 
results in (2) his inability to consult with counsel and participate in the criminal 
proceedings with a reasonable degree of understanding. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-
2 (West) (emphases added).  
 Mr. Galindo undisputedly meets the first prong: he was suffering from 
mental retardation. Mental retardation “is clearly defined by the American 
Psychiatric Association” as having a measured IQ of 70 and below. R.60. The 
Hawks Report reported that Mr. Galindo’s IQ “fell within the mental 
retardation/intellectual impairment range of intellectual functioning”—it 
reported his IQ as 54, plus or minus 5. R.56; R.60. The Wilkinson Report placed 
Mr. Galindo at an IQ score of T=33, placing him in the fifth percentile. R.45. 
Mr. Galindo also meets the second prong: he was unable to consult with his 
attorney and participate in the proceedings with a reasonable degree of 
understanding. Trial counsel’s affidavit explains that Mr. Galindo was unable to 
 21 
assist with preparation for trial; could not give trial counsel information about 
the incident, making it impossible to get adequate witnesses for the defense; did 
not appear to be able to understand the proceedings; and would agree with 
anything trial counsel suggested. (Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.). In fact, trial 
counsel had a haunch that Mr. Galindo was not able to comprehend what he was 
suggesting, and so he tested Mr. Galindo’s consistency and ability to counsel with 
him at trial by asking him two questions in a row, both suggesting totally opposite 
answers. Id. Mr. Galindo would respond in the affirmative to both questions. 
Aside from not being able to counsel with his trial attorney, his trial 
attorney also did not believe Mr. Galindo was mentally equipped to withstand 
testifying on the stand—an option that should be available to all defendants. But 
trial counsel attests that Mr. Galindo could not adequately testify at trial because 
of his intellectual disability, his inability to understand complex questions, and 
his total inability to be able to withstand any kind of cross examination. (Randy 
Richards Aff. Add. D.). 
Had Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel spoken with Dr. Hawks, all of this 
information would have been available to the doctor and to the trial court. Not 
only could Dr. Hawks had tested Mr. Galindo in the way that counsel did, but the 
trial court itself could have tested him for consistency in answering questions. 
And not only would the doctor’s assessment of Mr. Galindo’s competency likely 
have changed, but on its own accord the court’s assessment would also likely have 
changed. 
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3. The above errors cumulate to warrant reversal on appeal 
because together they raise sufficient doubt as to whether Mr. 
Galindo should have been found competent to stand trial 
Trial counsel committed two prejudicial errors here. First, trial counsel 
stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s competency after he called for an evaluation and 
hearing on the matter and in the face of evidence that Mr. Galindo was indeed 
incompetent to stand trial. See supra § 1. And the trial court relied in part on that 
stipulation. And second, trial counsel failed to discuss his observations and 
interactions with Mr. Galindo with Dr. Hawks in support of the Hawks Report. 
See supra § 2. Each of these errors standing alone caused sufficient prejudice to 
warrant reversal. But if this court considers that the prejudice stemming from 
these errors individually is insufficient to reverse, then it should apply the 
cumulative error doctrine. 
“Under the doctrine of cumulative prejudice, [an appellate court] will 
reverse if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence 
that a fair trial was had.” State v. King, 2017 UT App 43, ¶ 38, 392 P.3d 997 
(quotation omitted). “In assessing a claim of cumulative error, [appellate courts] 
consider all the identified errors, as well as any errors [the courts] assume may 
have occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When reviewing a claim 
of cumulative error, [appellate courts] apply the standard of review applicable to 
each underlying claim of error.” State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶ 53, 397 
P.3d 626 (quotation omitted).  
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For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendants must prove 
prejudice flowing from trial counsel’s error. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In the 
prejudice inquiry, trial counsel’s deficiencies must often be considered 
cumulatively as a whole, not item-by-item. See id. at 695; see also Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397 (2000). 
“When counsel’s representation is deficient in several respects, we do not 
try to measure the result of each individual error; instead we evaluate how the 
errors affected the overall fairness of the proceeding.” United States v. Medlock, 
645 Fed. App’x 810 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694–95 
(repeatedly stating prejudice inquiry in aggregate terms); see also Pavel v. 
Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 2001) (examining the cumulative weight of 
defense counsel’s flaws rather than the effect of them standing alone).  
“[C]umulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that 
individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it 
analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of trial is such that 
collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.” United States v. 
Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc). “Unless an aggregate 
harmlessness determination can be made, collective error will mandate reversal, 
just as surely as will individual error that cannot be considered harmless.” Id; see 
State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 97, 322 P.3d 624 (reciting test for cumulative 
error).  
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This court should remand here. The errors present in this case concerning 
the competency hearing are numerous. Trial counsel erred when he stipulated to 
Mr. Galindo’s competency and when he failed to discuss his interactions with Mr. 
Galindo with Dr. Hawks. Both issues on appeal go to whether Mr. Galindo should 
have been tried at all.  
Trial counsel should never have stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s competency 
when there was so much evidence supporting a determination of incompetence. 
There was more than enough evidence that Mr. Galindo satisfied the mental 
retardation aspect of the incompetency test. See R.60 (mental retardation “is 
clearly defined by the American Psychiatric Association” as having a measured IQ 
of 70 and below). Mr. Galindo’s IQ is reportedly about 54, plus or minus 5, which 
is on his best day somewhere closer to 59—still 11 points shy of 70. Another 
report stated he was in the bottom fifth percentile. R.45. And one of the reports in 
no uncertain terms stated that Mr. Galindo was “not able to consult with his 
attorney and participate in the proceeding against him with a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding.” R.41; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2. 
And had trial counsel made himself available to discuss his interactions 
with Mr. Galindo with Dr. Hawks so that they could be included in the Hawks 
Report, even more evidence would have supported a finding that. Trial counsel’s 
affidavit affirms that Mr. Galindo was unable to assist with preparation for trial 
and could not give trial counsel information about the incident, making it 
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impossible for him to get adequate witnesses for Mr. Galindo’s defense. He states 
that Mr. Galindo did not appear to be able to understand the proceedings and 
would agree with anything trial counsel suggested—even if the answers opposed 
each other. (Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.). What’s more, trial counsel did not 
believe that Mr. Galindo could adequately testify at trial because of his 
intellectual disability, his inability to understand complex questions, and his total 
inability to be able to withstand any kind of cross examination. (Randy Richards 
Aff. Add. D.). 
In light of the above, the result of Mr. Galindo’s competency hearing is far 
from trustworthy. Imagine a hearing where the doctors and trial court could 
consider the evidence included in trial counsel’s affidavit coupled with a 
vigorous—or even competent—argument from trial counsel on Mr. Galindo’s 
behalf. Trial counsel would have argued that Mr. Galindo was without a doubt 
unable to counsel him in preparation for his defense or to participate in 
defending the charges against him. And counsel would have provided details to 
the court supported his allegations. The outcome of that hearing could have been 
quite different than the outcome of the hearing Mr. Galindo got. 
Trial counsel’s double-whammy of (1) stipulating to competency and (2) 
failing to talk to Dr. Hawks amounts to almost total silence from trial counsel. At 
his competency, Mr. Galindo—for all intents and purposes—was left without an 
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advocate. These two issues should cumulate to obliterate this court’s confidence 
in the outcome of Mr. Galindo’s competency hearing. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Galindo didn’t get a fair shake at his competency hearing. Trial counsel 
stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s competency when both psychologists’ reports 
indicated that Mr. Galindo’s IQ placed him far below the mental retardation 
range. 
Trial counsel likewise failed to discuss with one psychologist Mr. Galindo’s 
lack of ability to counsel with him at trial or to participate in the proceedings 
against him. There is no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel’s decision not 
to discuss the case with him when trial counsel himself requested the evaluation 
and competency hearing. 
Cumulative error demands reversal here. For all intents and purposes, trial 
counsel’s errors left Mr. Galindo without an advocate at his competency hearing. 
This court’s confidence in the outcome of Mr. Galindo’s competency hearing 
should be shattered. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 2018. 
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OGDEN, UTAH - NOVEMBER 16, 2016
JUDGE ERNIE W. JONES PRESIDING
(Transcriber’s note: Speaker identification
may not be accurate with audio recordings.)
PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: All right. This is state versus
Patrick Galindo, it's case 2013, 2681 and 1398, and we
did a competency evaluation. I have two reports, one
from Dr. Wilkinson and one from Dr. Hawks. I believe
both of those indicates that Mr. Galindo was competent to
proceed; is that how you read that?
MR. RICHARDS: That's the way I read it as well.
I didn't personally talk to Mr. Hawks or Dr. Hawks, I
should say, and confirm that as well.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. RICHARDS: So given that, I think we're
willing to stipulate to competent based on those two
reports.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. RICHARDS: And we'd like to set a
preliminary hearing on the matter.
THE COURT: All right. And the state have any
objection to that finding?
MR. ARNOLD: No, your Honor, thank you.




























and stipulation of counsel the Court will enter a finding
then that Mr. Galindo is competent to proceed, and we
want to set a prelim then on case 19 -- or 1398, right?
MR. RICHARDS: Correct.
THE COURT: Attempted homicide.
MR. RICHARDS: Yes.
THE COURT: And do you want the affidavits just
to trail for now or --
MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, that would be what we would
like, yes.
THE COURT: All right. How long do you think
we're gonna need on the prelim?
MR. RICHARDS: I think one day's plenty.
THE COURT: One day, or?
MR. RICHARDS: Yes one.
THE COURT: What are you thinking in terms of
your schedules, do you want me to try for December some
time, or --
MR. ARNOLD: I am going to work with both my
schedule and Mr. Shaw's schedule.
THE COURT: Okay. I just had a case go off on
December 1, I don't know if that gives you enough time.
MR. ARNOLD: That's --






























MR. ARNOLD: Too quick.
THE COURT: Okay. I kind of thought so. I've
also got some time in the last -- the end of December, I
don't know if that's too -- I've got the 27th, 29th and
30th all open.
MR. RICHARDS: I could do the 27th.
MR. ARNOLD: Mr. Shaw is unavailable that last
week.
THE COURT: Oh, isn't he?
MR. ARNOLD: I believe he's --
THE COURT: Is he gone the whole week?
MR. ARNOLD: He's going to be gone from
Christmas until after the new year.
THE COURT: Okay, so we're looking at January?
MR. ARNOLD: Yes.
THE COURT: How about the third or the 5th of
January, I've got those days open.
MR. ARNOLD: You know, I'm currently --
MR. RICHARDS: Third I have a trial.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ARNOLD: And on the 6th, I start a murder






























MR. ARNOLD: We just kind of have an odd
schedule that way.
THE COURT: Couldn't do it on the 5th? Did you
say the 6th?
MR. ARNOLD: The 6th is when I begin that trial.
THE COURT: How long does it go? Your trial?
MR. RICHARDS: You said the 17th.
THE COURT: 17th? Okay.
MR. ARNOLD: We're in February, right?
MR. RICHARDS: No, January.
MR. ARNOLD: Okay. Oh, excuse me, I was looking
at the wrong month.
THE COURT: How about the 24th of January, I've
got that open?
MR. RICHARDS: I could do the 24th of January.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ARNOLD: That would be fine, we could find
-- well, let me check one thing. Mr. Shaw has a trial
scheduled right now.
THE COURT: On the 24th?
MR. ARNOLD: Yes.
THE COURT: How about the 30th or 31st of
January?
MR. RICHARDS: I'm gone that entire week, your




























THE COURT: How about February 2, Ground Hog
day?
MR. RICHARDS: I'm gone that whole week.
THE COURT: Oh, you're gone the whole week?
MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, yeah.
THE COURT: Okay. How about the 7th of
February?
MR. ARNOLD: I misspoke, I apologize, that's
when I actually start the murder trial in Judge Bean's
court, so what was the day in January?
THE COURT: In January, I had the 5th of
January, a Thursday, open.
MR. ARNOLD: Is that --
MR. RICHARDS: And I could do that if we start
it at like 9:15.
THE COURT: Or 9:30, I can give you 9:30.
MR. RICHARDS: 9:30, would that work?
THE COURT: Do you want to try that, January
5th?
MR. ARNOLD: Mr. Shaw told me, try not to set it
on that day, he's going to be out of town, so, he's quail
hunting.
THE COURT: Did we try the second or third of





























MR. RICHARDS: The third I have a bench trial.
THE COURT: How about the second? So that's a
holiday?
MR. RICHARDS: That's a holiday.
THE COURT: Oh, that's right, New Year's, thanks
Wendy.
MR. ARNOLD: You just got the day off.
THE COURT: So let's see, we're into February
then, is that --
MR. RICHARDS: Other January days, none? I
mean, I could do the 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th.
THE COURT: I had 16, 17 open, but.
MR. ARNOLD: I think the 16th is going to be a
holiday as well.
THE COURT: In February?
THE CLERK: Yes. No, January.
THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry, I'm into February, I
thought February 16th and 17th, was that --
MR. ARNOLD: Those are dates of the murder
trial.
THE COURT: Oh. All right. My gosh, I hate to
go much later. That's, November, December, that's four
months.





























MR. ARNOLD: Let's see, January. Well, the 18th
is our law and motion day, but I could do the 17th, but
you couldn't?
MR. RICHARDS: 17th, I'm open.
MR. ARNOLD: That would work.
THE COURT: Oh, all right. January 17th. 9:00
okay?
MR. RICHARDS: I can do nine on that day, yes.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. RICHARDS: Okay.
THE COURT: Do you think one day then?
MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, I would think so.
THE COURT: All right. So we set January 17th,
which is a Tuesday, right?
MR. RICHARDS: At 9:00.
THE COURT: Nine a.m.
MR. RICHARDS: All day.
THE COURT: All right, got you a date there Mr.
Galindo. I was starting to worry. All right.
(Whereupon the matter was concluded.)
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RANDALL W. RICHARDS, after being duly sworn upon his oath, states from 
firsthand knowledge of the facts and circumstances that: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah, over the age of 18, and fully competent to 
make this Affidavit. 
2. The matters stated below, unless stated to be made upon information and 
belief, are based upon my own personal knowledge, and if I were called to 
testify as a witness, I could and would competently attest thereto. 
3. I am the trial attorney of Patrick Galindo. 
4. During the proceeding it became abundantly apparent that Mr. Galindo was 
intellectually disabled, and thus unable to assist with preparation for trial or 
adequately be able to testify at trial. 
5. In conversing with Mr. Galindo, be did not appear to be able to understand 
the proceedings, and clearly was not able to give me information about the 
incident, making it impossible to gather adequate witnesses for the defense. 
6. He was able to converse with me, and always seemed happy, but certainly did 
not understand the gravity of the offenses, and did not comprehend at all that 
there was a real possibility of losing the trial. 
7. If had connected with Dr. Hawkes, I certainly would have been able to give 
him information as to my frustrations in trying to prepare a defense for Mr. 
Galindo due to bis inability to understand the gravity of the charges, and the 
necessity of having my investigator contact witnesses to build a possible 
defense. 
8. I also knew that attempting to put Mr. Galindo on the stand to testify in his 
own behalf, which under normal circumstances would have been the logical 
trial strategy given the nature of the offense and our claim that he was not 
even there at the time, was impossible due to the intellectual disability, his 
inability to understand complex questions, and his total inability to be able to 
withstand any kind of cross examination. 
9. In my lengthy discussions with Mr. Galindo, I discovered that he would agree 
to anything that I suggested. In fact in testing my hunch on this, I would ask 
him two questions in a row, suggesting totally opposite answers, and he 
would answer in the affirmative to both questions. 
10. Had I been able to convey this information to Dr. Hawkes, that may have 
swayed his opinion on competency. 
11. I was also amiss in failing to bring in Dr. Hawkes or another psychologist to 
inform the jury that Mr. Galindo was intellectually disabled, as that was one 
of the key components of the facts raised at trial, and that information was 
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